A ‘post-truth society’ has been defined as one in which ‘“objective facts” are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’.^Footnote1 The loaded term ‘post-truth’ is used to describe a broad stream of events and attitudes frequently perceived as a threat, particularly to science and politics. For example, the distrust of science found in a post-truth society is often seen as degenerative and destructive of democracy.^Footnote2 Although it is almost a ritual to refer to the fact that the term was the Oxford English Dictionaries word of the year in 2016,^Footnote3 the elaborate characterisation differs of course from one author to another. Political scientist Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen understands the term post-truth politics as describing ‘a predicament in which political speech is increasingly detached from a register in which factual truths are “plain”’,^Footnote4 while political theorist Saul Newman lists a number of what he considers typical traits—propagation of falsehoods, lies, misinformation, outrageous exaggeration and distortion of reality, and more.^Footnote5 Typically ‘post-truth’ is something that is said to have gained terrain recently.^Footnote6 Hyvönen sees in post-truth politics an erosion of shared facts and of common sources of information, which makes the situation historically unique.^Footnote7 Political scientist Manuel Cervera-Marzal takes a very different stand arguing that those who actively use the term post-truth also thereby make claims that the world has entered a new era, which Cervera-Marzal finds ridiculous. It is built on the assumption that there was a time when political debates were marked by facts and when those who governed acted according to truth and were evaluated on the basis of objective facts.^Footnote8 Other scholars claim, more modestly, that quite a number of post-truth traits are present in public discourses since long.^Footnote9 Neurologist Sebastian Dieguez takes a somewhat more pragmatic position. Even if the situation is not absolutely new, ‘post-truth’ may be a useful notion in a particular way simply by making us understand a possible situation regarding the cognitive relation humans have with the surrounding world and with themselves, he suggests.^Footnote10

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Another debate is the one around the relation between bullshit and post-truth. Evaluate the Implications of the “post-truth era” for Democratic Politics Paper. Hyvönen spends some time explaining the distinction between bullshit and post-truth, drawing heavily on the analyses of bullshit as discourses carefully chiselled out with much attention paid to every detail, in contrast to careless post-truth discourses.^Footnote11 In this article, that kind of distinction is unhelpful. First, how do we know that for instance Donald Trump has not crafted his speeches more and in other ways than they appear. Second, in this study, I am less interested in the amount of time someone has spent preparing, or not spent preparing a public appearance, as I look into the effects and how they may be understood.

Post-truth has attracted much interest in academic circles lately, and many different projects have been shaped. Hyvönen aims at working on the conceptualisation of post-truth in order to make the phenomenon more visible and thus facilitating a deeper analysis leading to a broader approach to truth in political science.^Footnote12 Political scientist Ignes Kalpokas has some affinity with Hyvönen in the way that post-truth is approached through conceptual history or history of ideas. The aim is to understand what is perceived as a shift towards post-truth in terms of ‘escapist romantic fantasy that masks the underlying reality of guilt’.^Footnote13 Political scientist Sebastian Schindler is seeking to establish greater clarity regarding the phenomenon post-truth politics in relation to the implications this very phenomenon has for contemporary critical thinking.^Footnote14 In the present study, the scope is a slightly different one. This essay focuses on post-truth politics, arguing that concentrating on political discourses as declarative fails to understand their performative character and their force.

A good example of post-truth politics is, of course, provided by President Donald Trump, who was for many years before entering politics a well-known public person and businessman. Of his way of working and making deals he observes:

I play to people‘s fantasies. People may not always think big of themselves, but they can still get very excited by those who do. That‘s why a little hyperbole never hurts. People want to believe that something is the biggest and the greatest and the most spectacular. I call it truthful hyperbole. It‘s an innocent form of exaggeration—and a very effective form of promotion.^Footnote15

The key here is that Trump tells people what they want to hear, applying what he sees as slight exaggeration, as ‘truthful hyperbole’; what he says is a bit more and a bit better than the truth but also not entirely without foundation. In Trump’s ‘post-truth’ attitude, ‘objective facts’ are less important than emotions and personal beliefs. His attitude corresponds well to many of the epithets of post-truth given above.

While Trump offers a good example of post-truth politics, there is something that interests me beyond the concrete case of Donald Trump. Rather, he brings to the fore traits in political discourses more generally; they are simply more visible in the extreme and reckless use of language in post-truth politics. In post-truth politics, people do not even pretend that ‘objective facts’ are significant—there are always ‘alternative facts’—while for instance emotions and personal beliefs are valued.^Footnote16 Moreover, political scientist Guiliano da Empoli argues that in this new political landscape, political agents—like the Movimento cinque stelle (Italy), the focus of his study, or Donald Trump^Footnote17—function as platforms with no political content, no programme and no vision: they are empty.^Footnote18

This overt disinterest in ‘facts’ and the programmatic vacuity of content have contributed to a crisis in contemporary society. The question addressed here is how this should be understood and how it should be dealt with. This essay begins with a brief look at an important mainstream academic reaction to post-truth politics, highlighting what most seems to upset philosophers and others. This is followed by my understanding of the raison d’être and the very functioning of political discourses, indicating that much of this mainstream reaction largely misses the point. A structuring idea of the discussion is that, in certain ways, post-truth political discourses function as political discourses are supposed to function. Then, very much inspired by a short text written by philosopher Jeffrey Nealon, I launch the idea that political discourses can be characterised as performative, in the sense of transforming and creating reality, before finally examining the force of political discourse—that which makes the discourse perform. Obviously, the work of J. L. Austin plays an important role, but it should also be clear that I have no ambition to perform an exegesis of his oeuvre. Evaluate the Implications of the “post-truth era” for Democratic Politics Paper.

The performative aspect of political discourse—that is, its transformation and creation of reality—entails that it also has the potential to transform the rules and the frameworks of the discourse itself. This has far-reaching implications. To what extent is it possible or useful to exit the conventional structures and overthrow established rules when change is sought? And what is the force driving the transformation? Questions must be raised regarding the role of intention and who—if anybody—can be designated the master of the discourse. One way of doing this is to broaden the perspective of what happens in verbal exchanges. The hearer-speaker relation is fundamental, as a double-sided relation in which meaning is shaped, and the performative force is formed. This evokes serious questions about responsibility and also about human action and freedom, although, given the limitations of space, only a few can be considered here.

Swedish philosopher and member of the Swedish Academy, Åsa Wikforss, places post-truth politics in the ‘postmodern’ and general ‘post-truth’ context. In this manner, she joins a broad fellowship found both inside and outside academia reacting strongly against what is characterised as resistance to facts and reality, which in their view implies neglecting evidence and objectivity. It is, she says, important to be well-informed and have the right knowledge in terms of politics and political choices, as well as fundamental choices concerning what kind of society one prefers.^Footnote19

Wikforss talks about ‘resistance to facts’—although she personally prefers ‘resistance to knowledge’—arguing that we must re-connect to facts, re-convert people to believe in evidence and base decisions on objectivity.^Footnote20 What Wikforss calls ‘resistance to knowledge’ is akin to what other scholars call ‘anti-intellectualism’, including David Block who offers two examples of this phenomenon in politics. The first is leading Brexiter Michael Gove, who is reported to have urged people to stop listening to the warnings of experts regarding Brexit; the second is Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel, who is said to have claimed that we should trust experts less and trust common sense more.^Footnote21 Making the point that people are actively discouraged from trusting experts, science and intellectually solid arguments, Block issues warnings against such anti-intellectualism.^Footnote22

Post-truth thus provokes a philosophical reaction on various levels. There is, however, one trait that concerns this study more than others. Wikforss tells that more than a third (35%) of the voters in the USA’s presidential elections of 2016 did not know that Obamacare was the same thing as the Affordable Care Act. Consequently, many people who were against the former did not realise that this meant they were also against the latter.^Footnote23 This can be read in two ways, and I think that Wikforss has a double message. On the one hand, it seems reasonable that people should know what they are voting for or against. If I want a particular political party to govern the country, it is of course unfortunate if I—for whatever reason—do not understand which ballot I should pick to express my desire and cast my vote according to my political preference. Certainly, one can agree with Wikforss that if voters do not understand which ballot to pick or if they are misled in this process, these are reasons to react and take measures. Philosopher Jacques Derrida is one of those who have been clear on this point: responsible decisions cannot be made without knowing what one is doing and without being conscious of what is being decided.^Footnote24

There is, however, another message in Wikforss’ text: the position of the values of ‘objectivity’, ‘evidence’, ‘fact’ and ‘knowledge’ in the political process. This is much more complex. I maintain that political choices are not primarily about facts but, rather, about orientation, direction and so on. Evaluate the Implications of the “post-truth era” for Democratic Politics Paper. Derrida perceives a tension or perhaps a paradox in this context. If making decisions is simply perceived as an issue of knowledge and if making decisions is limited to following some rule, then one must conclude that this simply represents a technical mise en œuvre of the cognitive apparatus, and consequently not about responsible choices.^Footnote25 In the same vein, philosopher Jean-François Lyotard argues that a political discourse is not about knowing. A good theoretical description of a problem is not enough in order to know what should be decided.^Footnote26 So, although responsible decisions and choices cannot be made if one disregards available information, facts and knowledge, it is equally misleading to think that responsible political decisions can be seen as straightforward outcomes of available information, established facts and acquired knowledge. As Lyotard points out, political utterances do not reflect a vision of the world that can be true or false.^Footnote27 Therefore, political discourses must be read differently.

A common struggle against post-truth politics, as outlined above, is not necessarily based on one specific understanding of politics. Yet there seems to be a bottom line, so to speak: it all turns on evidence, objectivity and facts. This is, however, problematic.

If focusing on these three elements, one is inclined to miss some very important aspects of politics and the conditions for political arguments. In politics, arguments are launched in order to create effects. Consequently, they are best understood as pragmatic. The goal of a political argument is to garner support for a project. The objective is not to present a veridical report of some state of affairs; nor is it about making a self-declaration in which the speaker gives their view on a particular topic. According to social epistemologist Steve Fuller, the aim of the politician is simply to be perceived as someone with such strong convictions about their political vision that they are prepared to do whatever it takes to bring it about. This in itself attracts enough support to turn the vision into reality. It becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. That means that the politician indeed participates in producing the reality for which they strive.^Footnote28

Political Discourses as Performative

In a slightly different vein, Nealon expresses the insight that politicians create or produce reality by their discourses. Informed by readings of Austin and Derrida, he suggests that what is ‘politically true’—or what can be called political truth—is, rather, performative, noting that ‘political truth functions not on the logic of facts’.^Footnote29 The notion of political discourses as performative is the axis for the rest of this paper.

In his Harvard lectures of 1955, subsequently published as How To Do Things With Words (1962), J. L. Austin launches the idea of performatives, identifying performative utterances as utterances that do not describe or report. Thus they are simply—in Austin’s terminology—opposed to constatives, which entails that they are not true/false and that they cannot be true or false. Therefore, no argumentation is necessary or even possible. The leading principle is that the very saying of the utterance is (part of) doing.^Footnote30 In other words, introducing performatives implies introducing the idea that to say something is to do something. In this fashion, Austin questions the idea that saying equals stating something.^Footnote31 In this respect, performatives can be seen as freed from truth-value while having value as force.^Footnote32

As Austin affirms, performatives are straightforward utterances that simply cannot possibly be true/false; rather, they do something—they perform. For instance, when ‘yes’ is uttered in a wedding ceremony, the utterance does something, it renders the utterer married. Evaluate the Implications of the “post-truth era” for Democratic Politics Paper. Neither the single phrase nor the web of utterances of which ‘yes’ is a part is a report or an account of their being married, desiring to be married or the like. Nay, the very saying of ‘yes’ does the job.^Footnote33 What is central, and cannot be overstressed, is that Austin thus concludes that the utterance is not an exterior and audible sign of an interior act undertaken by the utterer.^Footnote34 It works on its own, as it were. It is in this particular sense that political discourses are seen as performative. A political discourse is not (primarily) reporting something that is—or can be—true or false. The performative character of a political discourse means that it does something, it performs.

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In this way, it can be claimed that, given the performative character of political discourses, they are saying things that do not aspire to truth status as they are in a different register. It can even be claimed that political discourses have a mission to go beyond what is presently at hand. In this manner, they transform reality by saying things that are not true, but only in the sense of not being there. The very point of a political discourse is to suggest a different situation, something better than what presently is. This particular performative trait of political discourses becomes much more visible in the post-truth politics exemplified by Trump’s utterances. Everything that is otherwise called information, for instance, is questioned, and what many people call reports of facts are frequently labelled fake news; alternative facts are referred to without hesitation. There is not even an attempt to create or accept a common framework for deliberations. In a sense, this is politics drawn to its extremes. Performing is all there is.

Now, it may be said that the performative character is perhaps only seen from the outside, from the observer’s perspective. One might think that it looks different from the ‘inside’; that, to Trump and his supporters, what he says is indeed reporting and describing reality. Yet this may represent a misunderstanding regarding registers of communication. Derek Ford points out that when Trump tweets ‘FAKE NEWS!’, it has a number of implications on a register beyond describing reality or giving an account of what is. When Trump bawls in this manner, he is expressing an objection or discontent. Here, Trump is asserting his belief of what should be, Fords claims. Seen in this way, Trump’s tweet ‘FAKE NEWS’ is a performative utterance. A tweet like that is meant to organise and strengthen his side of the political fight, a function that is found in the very way the utterance is made. Hence, Ford continues, this particular usage reflects a perception of language as something more and different than a simple tool or instrument employed to transmit ideas. Consequently, Trump does not necessarily perceive this kind of utterance as something conveying a particular ideational content supposed to persuade the hearer. Not even from an inside perspective is the utterance thought of as a report that is true (or false). It appears rather to be the force of the utterance, as a performative utterance, that does the job. What it does is what counts, not whether truth is told or not.^Footnote35 A good illustration of this is when Trump’s press secretary states that “‘Whether it’s a real video, the threat is real’”^Footnote36 or, in other words, what is said may be untrue but what counts is the force of the utterance, what is communicated is on another level. Evaluate the Implications of the “post-truth era” for Democratic Politics Paper.

What is suggested in this paper is that post-truth politics is here, whether we like it or not. Yet, to many, post-truth politics has deeply upsetting traits. Therefore, many react strongly, and there are many endeavours to counteract the trend. Crucially, however, such efforts must not be counter-productive more broadly; they must not undermine the conditions for political discourses altogether. The suggestion here is that not only post-truth political discourses may be analysed as performative but also that this is a general trait of all political discourses, a central part of their functioning. This must be taken into account, I suggest, when understanding post-truth politics and countering its destructive aspects. If political discourses are seen as performative, a shift in focus is called for. There is no point asking, ‘Is it true?’ Rather, one should ask, ‘What happens?’^Footnote37 One consequence of this is that the ‘force’ of the utterance becomes a matter of interest—the topic addressed in the following section. Evaluate the Implications of the “post-truth era” for Democratic Politics Paper.